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Agents on the Web 
The Sentient Web
I n a startling revelation, a team of universityscientists has reported that a network ofcomputers has become conscious and sen-
tient, and is beginning to assume control of
online information systems.” Thus begins the plot
for many recent science fiction novels. In spite of
the ominous tone typically chosen for dramatic
effect, a sentient Web would be more helpful and
much easier for people to use. When people find
the Web frustrating, it is usually not because the
Web seems too smart, but because it is unintu-
itive and unintelligent. 
This fictional scenario could become reality —
the Web has a huge memory capacity and online
computational ability, and resources are not a lim-
iting factor – but how likely is it? What is the
future possibility for some form of sentience, and
what is the current sentient capability of the Web
and Web technology? 
Consciousness,
Awareness, and Free Will
Philosophers have debated the concept of con-
sciousness for centuries, and thousands of books
and papers have been written about it (David
Chalmers has a Web site devoted to referencing
these at www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/online.html).
Four things characterize being conscious: 
• knowing, 
• having intentions, 
• introspecting, and 
• experiencing phenomena. 
For the first two, it is easy to show that most Web
entities possess and demonstrate the use of knowl-
edge, and other entities, including Web services,
exhibit intentions. The last two, introspection and
phenomenal experience, are facets of awareness
and are not as obvious in current Web systems, so
I will consider them more thoroughly.
Introspection is often thought to deliver
humans’ primary knowledge of their mental life.
In addition to outwardly perceiving nonmental
entities, such as a rock in their environment,
people inwardly perceive their own mental enti-
ties, as when they “see” visual images using their
imagination. Some perceptions arise by invol-
untary subconscious processes, for example,
realizing that your arm itches. Others arise as a
result of mental actions, for example, an agent
choosing to observe its own decision-making.
The latter are the results of introspection and
thus constitute self-consciousness. Formal
approaches to introspection treat it either as
always retrospective — as a mental state that
reflexively represents itself — or as distinctly
available for linguistic or rational processing,
even if it is not itself perceived or otherwise
thought about by the conscious entity. (For
more, see Eric Lormand’s page on consciousness
at www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/
cons/consciousness.htm.)
As an example of human introspection (from
John McCarthy’s page on robots and consciousness,
www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/consciousness/
consciousness.html), suppose I ask you, “Is the pres-
ident of the United States standing, sitting, or lying
down at the moment?” You will probably answer
that you don’t know. If I then say, “Think harder
about it,” you will probably reply, “No amount of
thinking will help.” Introspection is required in
order to give this answer, and Web agents will
need a similar ability if they are to correctly decide
whether to think more about a question or to seek
externally the information they require.
An experience or other mental entity is phe-
nomenally conscious just in case there is “some-
thing it is like” for one to have it, for example, you
know what it is like to have a stomach ache. The
common kinds are
• perceptual experiences, such as tasting and
seeing; 
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• bodily-sensational experiences,
such as those of pains, tickles,
and itches; 
• imaginative experiences, such as
those of your own actions or per-
ceptions; and 
• streams of thought, as in the expe-
rience of thinking in words or in
images.
When faced with a choice, an agent
with free will has the following expe-
rience: first, what the agent ultimate-
ly does is what it chooses to do, sec-
ond, its choice precedes its action, and
third, it could have done otherwise (for
example, it could have changed its
mind at the last minute).1
Web Capabilities 
for Sentience
With approximately 1 billion PCs and
30 billion processors in existence that
execute more than an estimated
quadrillion CPU cycles per second, and
with thousands of petabytes of storage
available, the Web has more than
enough raw cognitive capacity for
human-level sentience. (A human
brain has an estimated processing
power of 300 million MIPS.2) However,
the Web has impoverished sensing and
effecting capabilities. With relatively
few physical sensors, it lacks a sense
of space, place, and time. Moreover,
the Web has even fewer physical
devices that can perform actions, make
changes, or conduct experiments in
the real world. 
A Thought Experiment
Consider a typical thermostat with a
single temperature sensor and a con-
troller for turning a heater on and off.
Now imagine the thermostat had an
unbounded cognitive capability for
remembering and reasoning: what
could the thermostat come to know?
It might first deduce a cause-and-
effect relationship between turning
on the heater and a rise in tempera-
ture. It might also notice that some-
times the cause-and-effect relation-
ship does not hold, as when the
heater is turned off for repair, the
weather changes suddenly, or a door
is left open — none of which the ther-
mostat can sense directly.
Given enough time, it might induce
the existence of daily and yearly tem-
perature cycles. Of course, that would
require a means for sensing time,
which might be achieved by giving the
thermostat another sensor, such as a
clock, or better, the ability to count its
own cycles — a rudimentary form of
self-awareness or introspection.
Given free will, the thermostat
could decide not to turn on the heater
when the temperature dropped below
a threshold. Computationally, this
means the thermostat could take one
of two possible actions: turning the
heater on (or off) and deciding to turn
the heater on (or off). Representing
and then remembering its decisions
provides the thermostat with a first
level of introspection.
If it were endowed with curiosity,
the thermostat might discover the
maximum temperature that can be
reached when the heater is left on
indefinitely, or the minimum tem-
perature when the heater is left off
indefinitely, or what happens if the
heater is cycled on and off rapidly.
(Such experimenting is essentially
what Doug Lenat’s Automated Math-
ematician program and its successor,
Eurisko, did in the domains of num-
ber theory and the learning of
heuristics in rule-based knowledge,
respectively. 3)
To perform such experiments, the
thermostat would need the ability to
alter its own algorithm for how it
responds to temperature changes. This
might be done by giving it two copies
of the algorithm — an original for ref-
erence and a second that it could alter
— and then allowing it a third possi-
ble action: altering the algorithm.
Such curiosity is not essential for
consciousness, but it would imply
that the thermostat had a level of
awareness about its temperature-
controlling functionality.
The thermostat would soon run out
of experiments it could try, however —
not because of a cognitive limit, but
because its sensing and acting
domains are so limited. Many more
interesting things would happen if we
now connected this thermostat to the
rest of the Web, but the limitation
would be the relatively few physical
actions and experiments the Web
could perform.
Building Sentience
The building blocks from which we
can describe consciousness are actions,
sensory information, memory, atten-
tion (the ability to decide about actions
and the decision-making process), and
time (both real and virtual). That is,
consciousness involves inputs, memo-
ries, ongoing internal processes, and
output intentions. 
Similar to the cognitive thermostat,
each Web entity would require the five
blocks, along with a representation of
its information and actions in a form
that it could use to communicate with
other entities.
There is an obvious intersection
between these building blocks and
the basic definition of a software
agent: an agent is an active, persis-
tent software component that per-
ceives, reasons, and acts, and whose
actions include communication.
Agents inherently take intentional
actions based on sensory information
and memories of past actions. (See
the “Seven Years of Agents on the
Web” sidebar, next page, for a
description of how previous columns
have examined similar aspects of
agents.) All agents have the neces-
sary communication ability, but they
do not necessarily possess introspec-
tive capabilities or awareness of
place and time.
As fundamental as time is to an
agent situated in the Web or the real
world, it has largely been neglected in
agent research to date. For example,
time is not considered in the Founda-
tion for Intelligent Physical Agents
(FIPA) specification for an agent-com-
munication language. Similarly, agents
do not typically maintain models of
their own reasoning, which they need
for introspection.
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Future Prospects
Work on developing human-like sen-
tience and consciousness for the Web
and other networked systems is just
beginning. There is also heated
debate about whether a computation-
al system can ever attain such con-
sciousness, or is merely limited to
mimicking it.4 Whether it attains or
mimics consciousness, the Web will
continue to become a richer and more
interesting space for people and
machines to use, and for agents to
reside.
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Seven Years of Agents on the Web
This column, Agents on the Web, hasappeared 38 times since the inaugur-
al issue of IEEE Internet Computing in
1997. During that time, my various coau-
thors and I have addressed numerous
aspects of Internet-situated agents and
their applications.We have also addressed
agent characteristics, such as their sens-
ing, reasoning, and communicating abili-
ties. This final column, which will be
replaced by an Agents track that will fea-
ture a more in-depth article in each issue
in 2004, provides an opportunity for
some introspection.
We have shown how agents can make
and execute commitments based on their
beliefs and intentions; how they can be
embedded into environments; how they
can potentially be endowed with philoso-
phies that guide their actions; how agents
can negotiate with each other and with
people; and how they can reach a mutual
understanding by reconciling their individ-
ual ontologies and even learning a lan-
guage.The focus of research in this area
has now shifted
• from how agents can cooperate with
each other to how much they should
cooperate;
• from what language agents can use to
communicate to what and when
agents should communicate;
• from how agents can learn to what
should be learned;
• from how we can describe and reason
about agent commitments to how
commitments can be monitored and
enforced; and
• from how we can implement agents to
how we can use them to implement
other systems.
During these seven years, agent charac-
teristics have progressed to the point
where system developers now routinely
apply and rely on agents.Agents are used
to fight spam, monitor firewalls for intru-
sions,manage network connections, auto-
mate online auctions and supply chains,
implement knowledge portals, and aid indi-
viduals searching for information and
shopping. I have enjoyed writing about
agents because they are useful and
because I believe they will become the
basis for most programming and comput-
ing in the near future.
With the support of efforts such as
DARPA’s Agent Markup Language (DAML)
and Control of Agent-Based Systems
(CoABS), the agent paradigm has been
instrumental in moving the Web from a
resource for people to a resource for
computers—the Semantic Web. Soon it
will enable the “pragmatic Web” — a
resource for making distributed decisions
and getting work done. In the end, it just
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